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Introduction
The early stages of the ﬁnancial revolution in England were marked
by ﬂux and uncertainty. Only after the conclusion of the War of the
Spanish Succession in  was it clear that the Bank of England
and its banking monopoly would be preserved, that it would act in
turn as a central bank to the burgeoning ﬁnancial markets centred
on Exchange Alley in the City of London, and as the conduit for
the ﬂotation of growing amounts of public debt by an increasingly
embattled Treasury. This formed the basis for the extraordinary
growth of English public and private ﬁnance during the eighteenth
century, when the reputation of the system reached the stage that
it not only handled the domestic public debt but also began to
ﬂoat loans on behalf of other powers in Europe, though it did not
replace Amsterdam as the main centre of foreign lending until the
s.1 The War of the Spanish Succession between  and 
was therefore a key moment of transition, as the structures and
I would like to thank the participants in the ‘War of the Spanish Succession’ conference
held at the German Historical Institute London in September  for their comments
on an earlier version of this essay. David Parrott, Guy Rowlands, Hannah Smith,
Hamish Scott, and Peter Wilson have all helped me to develop these ideas further.
I am grateful to the Bank of England Archives, Coutts & Co., and the Henry E.
Huntington Library, San Marino, California, for permission to examine and cite the
sources quoted here. This essay was researched and written with ﬁnancial support
from the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the British Academy.
1 P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of
Public Credit, – (London, ), –. For studies of further imperial loans
see Ernest Mason Satow, The Silesian Loan and Frederick the Great (Oxford, ); Karl F.
Helleiner, The Imperial Loans: A Study in Financial and Diplomatic History (Oxford, );
S. R. Cope, Walter Boyd, a Merchant Banker in the Age of Napoleon (Gloucester, ). For
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networks that would sustain public credit shifted into their ﬁnal
conﬁgurations, shaping the ﬁscal, military, and strategic options
that would be available to subsequent ministries.
This essay examines one manifestation of this process, and how
the ﬂotation of loans on behalf of the imperial court in Vienna in
 and  became a political as well as ﬁnancial transaction
that eventually embraced the key arms of the British ﬁscal–military
state. The episode was mentioned in passing in P. G. M. Dickson’s
deﬁnitive study of the early English ﬁnancial revolution, and ex-
amined in more depth by Hanns Leo Mikoletzky in an article of
 that drew on diplomatic correspondence in the Austrian State
Archives to good eﬀect.2 This essay ﬁlls out the British side of the
story, highlighting the diplomatic complexities of organizing these
loans and using the patterns of subscription, agency, and transac-
tion in England to demonstrate the existence of certain key political
and ﬁnancial intermediaries who exercised highly disproportionate
inﬂuence, and seem to have helped channel the ﬂow of resources
into the loans. The capacity to project British power overseas, in this
case by subsidizing allied armies, was therefore not merely a matter
of bureaucratic elaboration and innovation, but instead reﬂected
the successful operation of informal personal linkages that crossed
institutional boundaries to co-ordinate action, helping to entrench
this particular way of operating in the wider British ﬁscal–military
state.
‘Secure in their Reimbursement’: Organizing the Imperial Loan of 
The fact that a foreign, absolutist, and Catholic Habsburg imperial
monarchy could successfully ﬂoat a loan for £, in  and
another for £, in  in London would seem to suggest
that English ﬁnancial markets were already highly impersonal,
and thus well placed to support the increasingly bureaucratic and
eﬃcient ﬁscal and military structures of the British state.3 Yet as
late as the s the banker Walter Boyd exercised close personal
the loan market in Amsterdam see James C. Riley, International Government Finance and
the Amsterdam Capital Market, – (Cambridge, ).
2 Dickson, Financial Revolution, ; Hanns Leo Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe von
: Ein Beitrag zur österreichischen Finanzgeschichte’, Mitteilungen des Österreichischen
Staatsarchivs,  (), –. I am indebted to Rebecca Friedman and Caleb Karges
for translating this key article for me.
3 For the ﬁnancial revolution see Dickson, Financial Revolution, and Larry Neal, The
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inﬂuence over the imperial loans ﬂoated in London, and this is even
more evident in  and . In fact, although the loans did not
originate with the British ministry, its leaders—John Churchill, ﬁrst
duke of Marlborough, and the Lord Treasurer, Sidney Godolphin,
ﬁrst earl Godolphin—soon became convinced that to grant the
loan application would ultimately serve British strategic interests,
and for this reason it became an instrument of public policy.
The success of the loan therefore reﬂected the intense diplomatic,
political, and ﬁnancial assistance oﬀered by the ministry and its
sympathizers in London, transmitted mainly through informal
networks and connections that can only occasionally be glimpsed
through patterns of subscription and sale. This section demonstrates
how the diplomatic framework for the imperial loan of  was
put in place, and incorporated measures demanded by subscribers
to protect the collateral that the emperor oﬀered. The next section
will show how these informal networks were then mobilized to draw
in further investors, while the ﬁnal section assesses whether the later
imperial loan of  was ﬂoated under the same circumstances.
The ﬁrst imperial loan was raised between January and June 
in relatively desperate strategic and ﬁnancial conditions. Despite
victory at Blenheim in , the position of the allied armies was
not promising, particularly in north-west Italy, where the imperial
army under Prince Eugene of Savoy had been defeated by French
forces in August , threatening imperial power in the region
and the allegiance of the duke of Savoy.4 Military reinforcements
were urgently needed but the Habsburg monarchy had diﬃculty
raising the necessary cash. The new Habsburg monarch, Joseph I,
had instituted a crash programme of ﬁnancial reform in 
to address this problem, but the British ambassador at Vienna,
George Stepney, noted in November  that expedients such as
the new Vienna City Bank had failed to answer their unrealistic
Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason (Cambridge,
); and for bureaucratic reform see John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money
and the English State, – (London, ), and Roger Morriss, The Foundations of
British Maritime Ascendancy: Resources, Logistics and the State, – (Cambridge, ).
For an alternative interpretation, which questions the narrative of bureaucratization,
see Aaron Graham, Corruption, Party and Government in Britain, – (Oxford, ),
–.
4 Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’, –, –; Charles W. Ingrao, In Quest and
Crisis: Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg Monarchy (West Lafayette, Ind., ), –;
Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire,  vols. (Oxford, –), ii.
–.
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[] Conﬁrm no
recto/verso designation in the
reference to fo. ?
expectations.5 When Marlborough arrived in Vienna that October
to make arrangements for the  campaign, he came under
pressure to secure a loan of , crowns or roughly £,
from the English and Dutch governments.6 Particular pressure
came from Eugene himself as president of the Council of War or
Hofkriegsrat, and also from Philip Ludwig von Sinzendorﬀ as court
chancellor, the prince de Salms as the emperor’s ﬁrst minister, Count
Starhemberg as president of the chamber of audit or Hofkammer,
and Count Wratislaw as Bohemian chancellor.7 Using his inﬂuence
in London and at The Hague, Marlborough was able to secure the
loan from both governments, which Stepney estimated would cover
about a quarter of the total funds required to keep the imperial
armies in the ﬁeld in northern Italy.8
Beyond the immediate need for the cash,which suﬀered numerous
delays on its way to the imperial troops in Italy, the Habsburg court
seems already to have had further ends in view. Stepney noted to
Robert Harley, one of the secretaries of state, on  October that
Starhemberg had taken particular measures to assure him that the
money would be used only for the imperial troops in Italy: ‘he is
an honest and punctual man’, he wrote, ‘and I believe will have a
particular care to be exact on this occasion, in hopes of establishing
by that means some degree of credit in England and Holland for the
future.’9 InNovember the ideawas raised of oﬀering a private loan in  []
both places that would provide further support for the hard-pressed
imperial forces, and which would be secured against the revenues
arising from Habsburg rents and silver taxes in the province of
Silesia. Marlborough ﬂoated the idea at The Hague on his way back
to Britain from Vienna in December, but very cautiously, ‘[parce
que] ne voulant pas presser la’dessus que l’autre ne soit ﬁni’, he
told de Salms on  December, and he noted to Wratislaw the same
day that there was no enthusiasm for the loan among the members
of the States-General or the mercantile community.10 In fact the
5 The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), SP /, fo. v: Stepney to
Harley,  Nov.  (NS). (Letters sent from Europe are dated in the Gregorian
calendar or ‘New Style’ (NS), and from Britain in the Julian or ‘Old Style’ (OS). The
latter was eleven days behind the former.) For the Habsburg reforms see Ingrao, In
Quest and Crisis, –. 6 Ibid. –.
7 Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’, ; Ingrao, In Quest and Crisis, –.
8 TNA, SP /, fo. r: Stepney to Harley,  Nov.  (NS).
9 TNA, SP /, fo. : Stepney to Harley,  Nov.  (NS).
10 Marlborough to de Salm,  Dec. ; Marlborough to Wratislaw,  Dec. ,
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States-General was already dragging its feet in the matter of the
public loan for , crowns, and Marlborough was forced to fall
back on the plan he had ﬁrst noted to Godolphin from Vienna in
November of raising the money in London. ‘[It will not] be possible
to get any part of the loan of £, here, notwithstanding that
the security oﬀered is the best in Germany’, he noted from The
Hague on  December, ‘so that if you can’t ﬁnd a way that the Bank
of England may lend it I am afraid the Emperor will be necessitated
to recall the remainder of his troops in Italy.’11
When he returned to London in late December, Marlborough
therefore brought with him proposals for the loan, and although
there are very few letters that survive from this crucial period, it is
clear that he was working behind the scenes with Godolphin and
various Whig ministers and their allies in the City of London to
lay the necessary groundwork. The imperial ambassador Johann
Phillip Hoﬀman reported back that Marlborough had met with
Godolphin, the earl of Sunderland, and the earl of Halifax on 
January, along with eight ﬁnanciers and bankers, to discuss the
terms of the loan. The last of these had drawn up a set of proposals
for Godolphin as a basis for discussion, requiring that repayment
of the loan be made in pounds sterling ‘to prevent all manner
of disputes relating to exchange or diﬀerence’, and particularly
requiring that for their security the emperor ‘make a solemn and
irrevocable grant or assignment of such part of his said revenue
in Silesia as will be suﬃcient to discharge the whole debt’, with
a further explicit declaration from the city of Breslau conﬁrming
their obligation to pay their share of the loan ‘as a corroborative
security’.12Hoﬀman had been instructed to oﬀer  per cent interest,
and the proposals that Marlborough brought with him had been
in The Letters and Dispatches of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough, from –,
ed. John Murray,  vols. (London, ), ii. , .
11 Marlborough to Godolphin,  Nov.  (NS),  Nov.  (NS),  Dec.
 (NS),  Dec.  (NS), in The Marlborough–Godolphin Correspondence, ed. Henry
Leonard Snyder,  vols. (Oxford, ), ii. , , –; Mikoletzky, ‘Die große
Anleihe’, –.
12 Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’, –, based on a letter from Hoﬀman to
Joseph I of  Jan.  (apparently dated New Style, since the meeting was held on 
January Old Style); British Library, London [hereafter BL], Add. MS , fo. r–v:
‘Proposals humbly oﬀered to the most Hon. the Lord High Treasurer of England, by
which according to the opinion of several eminent merchants a Loan of £, may
be procured in this City for supporting the Emperor’s army under Prince Eugene, and
carrying on the war in Italy with vigour’, c. Jan. /. See also the copy in Letters
and Dispatches, ed. Murray, ii. –.
Created on 2 August 2017 at 20.26 hours page 303
  
drawn up on that basis, but Marlborough warned Sinzendorf that
‘qu’on y a ajoute un percent d’interet, ce qu’on n’a pas refuser,
puisque nous avons plusiers fonds en Angleterre qui donnent le
meme interet de huit per cent’.13 The loan might therefore have
been crowded out of the market entirely had the Treasury not
tested the water informally beforehand and persuaded Hoﬀman
to oﬀer more generous terms: ‘we have added one percent to the
interest’, Marlborough told Stepney, ‘without which it is thought
by those that are most knowing in these matters [that] it would be
very diﬃcult, if not impossible, to get so great a sum subscribed’.14
This preliminary groundwork materially improved the prospects of
success, and Marlborough felt enabled to reassure Wratislaw that
the loan was already ‘en bon train’.15
The eventual success of the loan would depend not only on
making terms that investors in London could accept but also on
persuading the imperial court in Vienna to agree to them, drawing
Stepney back into the process. ‘The merchants and others who lend
this money have an entire reliance on you in this aﬀair, that they
may be secure of their reimbursement’, Marlborough told him on
 January, when he sent the ﬁnal set of terms for conﬁrmation,
‘and I have assured them you will use all the precautions a matter
of so great concern requires.’16 Stepney replied on  February that
‘I shall endeavour to serve them to the best of my power.’17 He
immediately transmitted the terms to the Habsburg court to be laid
before the Silesian Estates for ratiﬁcation, taking the opportunity
to insert the several further amendments noted below in the light
of further developments. Imperial inﬂuence sped the new proposal
through the Estates, which accordingly agreed on  February
and passed an instrument of obligation that ‘own[ed] ourselves
indispensably bound and obliged with all humble respect, dutifully
and cheerfully to accomplish the desire of His Imperial Majesty in
this matter’ by paying the principal and interest loaned in London
13 Marlborough to Sinzedorf,  Jan. /, in Letters and Dispatches, ed. Murray, ii.
–. For Hoﬀman see Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’, –.
14 Marlborough to Stepney,  Jan. /, in Letters and Dispatches, ed. Murray, ii.
; Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’, –.
15 Marlborough to Sinzedorf,  Jan. /; Marlborough to Wratislaw,  Jan.
/, in Letters and Dispatches, ed. Murray, ii. , .
16 Marlborough to Stepney,  Jan. /, in Letters and Dispatches, ed. Murray,
ii. .
17 TNA, SP /, fo. r: Stepney to Harley,  Feb.  (NS).
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within the ﬁve years speciﬁed.18 The ratiﬁcation was then returned
to Vienna, where Stepney and the key ﬁgures in the imperial court
met to hammer out the remaining arrangements to make the loan
a practical proposition.
‘It may not be necessary to trouble Your Grace with a recital of
what passed at this meeting, since the result will best appear from
the Instruments themselves’, Stepney wrote to Marlborough several
days later, ‘and I hope both Your Grace and others concerned in
the Loan will be satisﬁed I have done my part, having neglected no
circumstances that might prove of advantage to them, nor suﬀered
any of the clauses or conditions which had been recommended to
me to be either altered or omitted’.19 For example, he had tried
to have the city of Breslau explicitly named in the instrument as
part of the collateral—‘on which particular I insisted very heartily’,
he reported, ‘because some stress seems to be laid on it in the rd
Article of the Proposals’—but was persuaded by the court that it
was both unnecessary and impolitic. ‘For these reasons I let fall
that demand’, Stepney noted, ‘and in lieu of it proposed another
condition which may appear of better security’, speciﬁcally that a
clause be inserted guaranteeing British investors priority over all
other imperial creditors whose loans were secured on the Silesian
revenues.20 He also successfully pressed for the funds to be used
speciﬁcally for the payment of Prince Eugene and the imperial army
in Italy, ‘since I humbly conceived the Prince’s name and reputation
may have gone a good way towards encouraging subscriptions to
the Loan’, even though the imperial court initially objected that this
breached the new administrative practice of routing all payments
through the Hofkammer in Vienna.21
The main point of contention was who should send the money
from London to north Italy, which Starhemberg insisted should
be done by imperial agents in London.22 Stepney thought that he
hoped to proﬁt from the advantage of exchange, but the main aim
was probably to avoid the delays that had marked the previous loan
18 Bank of England Archives, London (hereafter BEA), M/, fos. r–r; Mikoletzky,
‘Die große Anleihe’, –, –. Mikoletzy notes that unfortunately the limited
surviving documents do not allow a more detailed study of these negotiations between
the imperial court and the Silesian Estates.
19 BL, Add. MS , fos. r–r: Stepney to Marlborough,  Feb.  (NS).
20 Ibid. fos. v–r.
21 Ibid., fos. v–r. See also Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’, –.
22 BL, Add. MS , fo. r–v; Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’, –.
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of , crowns.23 The imperial court therefore tried to insist on
this point, ‘[but] I was obliged to represent to him that the parties
concerned in the Loans secured by their subscription have settled
the care of the remittances in their Trustees’, Stepney reported,
‘who, being bankers, may probably expect some moderate proﬁt in
return for the trouble they are likely to have’, and this persuaded
the Habsburg court to give way. Starhemberg also tried to pin
down arrangements for remitting interest and repayments from
Silesia back to London, ‘whether it may be more for the Emperor’s
advantage to undertake it by his own agents or agree at a certain
rate with some of our merchants, who should engage to receive
the money as it becomes due at Breslau and be at the trouble and
risk of remitting the same to the Bank of England’.24 Stepney was
able to head oﬀ this question and persuade the court to refer back
to London the issue of repayment and the exact exchange rates to
be adopted, to be ratiﬁed formally once these had been agreed.
Diplomatic pressure was therefore crucial in securing the terms
required by ﬁnancial interests in London before they would commit
to the loan.
‘Pour exciter les marchands’: Subscription and Remittance, –
In June  an imperial instrument was ﬁnally signed and sealed
conﬁrming the terms of the loan, the pledge of the Silesian Estates,
and the promise ‘that all our cameral, provincial revenues, rents and
possessions belonging to us in Silesia . . . we make over and engage,
by way of special hypotheque [sic], pledge and security’, with
the further guarantee that ‘we do likewise deliberately renounce
forever . . . all and every matter anyways tending to the weakening
or impairing of the same’.25 In fact the loan itself had already been
in train since January, in anticipation of the ﬁnal settlement of its
terms, and the ﬂotation was shepherded through the City by a small
clique of bankers and ﬁnanciers who were interested in more than
just private proﬁt, and used their networks to ﬁnd the necessary
investors. Of course, motives were not entirely selﬂess. As noted
above, the ﬁnanciers insisted from the outset on a higher rate of
23 TNA, SP /, fo. v: Stepney to Harley,  Nov.  (NS); TNA, SP /,
fos. r, v: Stepney to Harley,  Jan.  (NS),  Feb.  (NS).
24 BL, Add MS , fo. v: Stepney to Marlborough,  Feb.  (NS);
Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’, –. 25 BEA, M/, fos. r–r.
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interest and suﬃcient collateral to secure their investment, and in
March Stepney received a petition from the textile merchants of
south-west England repeating their request that he get the ban on
the import of their serges to Austria lifted. He promised in return
to ‘once more endeavour to get [it] revoked, on occasion of the
Loan . . . in hopes that argument may be more prevalent than
several others I used in my last memorial  months ago, to which
I have not been able to obtain the least answer’.26 Yet the element
of public interest was also strong, since the loan would support
British and imperial policy in northern Italy, and for this reason
sympathetic ﬁnancial elites in London worked to make it a success.
Three days after the informal meeting between Marlborough,
Godolphin, and key political and ﬁnancial interests on  January,
Marlborough was able to write to Wratislaw that ‘je compte cela
pour une aﬀaire faite’. The following week the London diarist Nar-
cissus Luttrell reported that an informal subscription had opened on
the Royal Exchange. At the meeting it had been agreed that a royal
warrant would publicly be issued to the Lord Mayor of the City of
London encouraging the wider ﬁnancial community to subscribe
to the loan—‘pour exciter les marchands et autres’, Marlborough
wrote to Sinzendorﬀ that night, ‘a preter leur argent’—although
the actual formal instrument setting out the purposes, terms, and
security of the loan and appointing  trustees to accept subscrip-
tions did not pass the privy seal until  February.27 It rehearsed
the wider strategic and ﬁnancial arguments for the support of the
imperial army in Italy, ‘most earnestly . . . recommend[ed]’ the
loan, and pledged that ‘by our minister at the imperial Court and
otherwise [we shall] take all possible care that the principal money
and also the interest thereof shall be punctually paid’. Hoﬀman
had earlier reported a degree of suspicion that the emperor was
prioritizing the conﬂict with the Ottoman Empire in Hungary over
British strategic interests in northern Italy—an English merchant
had told him that he would not make any subscription unless he
could be assured it would go to Eugene’s army—and the declara-
tion was therefore of no small importance.28 ‘Nous attendons avec
impatience le retour du courier avec la ratiﬁcation des conditions,
26 TNA, SP /, fo. r: Stepney to Harley,  Mar.  (NS).
27 Marlborough to Sinzendorﬀ,  Jan. /, in Letters and Dispatches, ed. Murray,
ii. –; BL, Harleian MS , fo. r.
28 Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’, –.
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[] Conﬁrm spelling
‘auncunement’ in the original?
sans quoi on ne peut prendre leur souscriptions’, Marlborough told
Wratislaw on  February, nearly two weeks after the treaty had in
fact been signed, ‘mais d’abord que cela sera arrive, vous pouvez
compter qu’on commencera incessament a faire les remises’.29
The actual instrument did not arrive until early March with
Count Johann Wenzel Gallas, the imperial envoy, and it was not
until  March that Luttrell reported that the subscription had at
last formally opened, though he noted that £, had already
been underwritten by a large number of political and ﬁnancial
ﬁgures.30 Payments were staggered between March and July, and
Marlborough and Godolphin wasted no time laying the instrument
on  March before the seven trustees elected by the subscribers
a few days before to manage their interests.31 ‘Demain Monsr le
Comte de Gallas doit les communiquer en conference avec les
interesses’, Marlborough told de Salm on  March, ‘et je ne
doute auncunement que le tout ne soit regle pour commencer les  []
remises aujourd’hui en huit’, promising, as Stepney had assured
Starhemberg in February, that the imperial court would not suﬀer
from the rate of exchange that was arranged.32 He also repeated
Stepney’s assurance that the trustees could be depended on not
to proﬁt unduly from either the subscription or the remittance,
noting that Starhemberg ‘might repose an entire conﬁdence in
those gentlemen, who would infallibly discharge their trust with the
greatest integrity, being persons of known zeal to the common cause
and above the temptations of mean interests’.33
The subscription therefore anticipated the ﬁnal conﬁrmation
of the terms of collateral and repayment, and shows how the
subscribers were prepared to make exceptions in order to serve
the public interest and dispatch the cash to Prince Eugene. The
trustees released the ﬁrst tranche of £,within a few days for the
merchant and ﬁnancier Sir Theodore Janssen, himself an investor, to
29 Murray, Letters and Dispatches, ii. , : Marlborough to Wratislaw,  Feb.
/; Marlborough to Prince Eugene,  Feb. /.
30 Narcissus Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation of State Aﬀairs from September  to April
,  vols. (Oxford, ), iv. , . For Gallas see Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’,
–; and Aaron Graham, ‘Public Service and Private Proﬁt: British Fiscal–Military
Entrepreneurship Overseas, –’, in Jeﬀ Fynn-Paul (ed.), War, Entrepreneurs and the
State in Europe and the Mediterranean, – (Leiden, ), –, at –.
31 Luttrell, Brief Relation, ii. ; BEA, M/, fos. r, r.
32 Marlborough to Sinzendorﬀ,  Mar. /, in Letters and Dispatches, ed. Murray,
ii. .
33 BL, Add. MS , fo. v: Stepney to Marlborough,  Feb.  (NS).
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remit to his agents Messrs Thomas and Samuel Williams in Venice,
who had also handled remittances for the loan of , crowns
in February.34 Further tranches of £, followed on  April, 
May,  June—though the Bank of England was forced to lend some
£, until it was received from subscribers the next day—and 
July, making a total of some £, or ,, Venetian ducats
once around £, had been deducted as commission and charges
for Janssen, the Bank of England, and Messrs Williams in Venice.35
Stepney kept a close eye on the process, reporting that the funds had
indeed been sent over to the imperial commissary in northern Italy
to purchase provisions.36 These then arrived at a crucial moment in
the allied campaigns, enabling Prince Eugene to break the French
siege of Turin and complete the destruction of French power in
northern Italy, thereby decisively establishing Habsburg control of
the region. When his aide-de-camp Baron Hohendorﬀ appeared
in London in October with news of the victory, he was wined and
dined by the trustees of the loan to mark the victory, suggesting that
for them at least the loan had always been about more than mere
ﬁnancial proﬁt.37
The pattern of subscriptions also suggests that the loan was
actively promoted and not simply left to the vagaries of the market.
Marlborough,Godolphin, Sunderland, andHalifax all agreed at the
meeting on  January to subscribe between £, and £,
each to get the ball rolling, though Godolphin had to sell oﬀ his
stock in the Bank of England to do so.38 This had the desired eﬀect,
and Luttrell particularly remarked that they and ‘several others of
the nobility and citizens have also subscribed largely [to the loan]
34 BEA, M/, fos. r–r, esp. r; TNA, SP /, fo. r: Stepney to Harley,
 Feb.  (NS). Messrs Williams later noted that they had managed to raise the
necessary cash in Venice ‘at a time when credit was diﬃcult to be obtained’, albeit
in the context of a claim for repayments due for errors in accounts: TNA, SP /,
fo. r: ‘Petition of Thomas Williams to His Majesty the King’,  Dec.  (NS) [but
misdated as ].
35 BEA, M/, fo. r; Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’, –.
36 TNA, SP /, fo. r–v: Stepney to Harley,  Mar.  (NS).
37 Luttrell, Brief Relation, vi. .
38 Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’, –. This paragraph is based on the list of
subscribers in BEA, M/, fos. r–r, and reprinted with only minor changes as A
List of the Names of All the Subscribers to the Loan of ,l. to the Emperor of Germany, for
Support of the Army, under his Highness Prince Eugene of Savoy, in Italy, and Payable to His
Order: Begun the th, and Ended the th of March,  (London, ). For Godolphin see
Godolphin to Duchess of Marlborough,  Mar. , in Correspondence, ed. Snyder, ii.
–.
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and ’tis believed will be full in a short time’.39Marlborough had also
agreed on  January to persuade senior oﬃcials and politicians to
invest, and subscriptions for sums between £ and £, were
made by the secretary at war Henry St John and the secretaries
of state Robert Harley and Charles Hedges, as well as £,
from the queen’s consort, Prince George of Denmark, through his
treasurer Sir Edward Nicholas. Military treasurers such as James
Brydges, John Howe, and William Whitﬁeld—paymasters of the
army and marine regiments—all subscribed, as did Marlborough’s
quartermaster general William Cadogan. Stepney arranged from
Vienna to invest at least £, through Marlborough’s secretary
Adam Cardonnel, who also subscribed no less than £, of his
own money in addition.40 The loan was also ﬁlled by government
contractors such as Moses de Medina, who subscribed £,,
and the army clothiers Richard Harnage and Henry Cornish, who
subscribed £, on their own account and £, on behalf of
others.41
By far the largest amount, though, came through the money
markets of the City of London, in some cases through brokers,
agents, and goldsmith-bankers investing sums on behalf of clients.42
The broker Moses Hart subscribed £ on his own account, for
example, but £, for others, including £, for the trustee Sir
William Gore. Although reconstructing the intentions behind these
decisions is often impossible, it seems clear that many agents helped
to direct money under their control into the loan, or else smoothed
the path for contacts who wanted to invest. For instance, the trustee
Francis Eyles invested £, on his own behalf and £, for
his brother-in-law, the Whig merchant John Haskin Styles, while
Sir William Scawen and his brother Thomas subscribed £, in
total on their own account and on behalf of John Herman Louis.43
Another trustee, Sir Gilbert Heathcote, invested £, of his own
39 Marlborough to Wratislaw,  Jan. /, in Letters and Dispatches, ed. Murray, ii.
; Luttrell, Brief Relation, vi. .
40 Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’, .
41 For Medina, Harnage, and Cornish see Graham, Corruption, Party and Government ,
, , , –, –.
42 This paragraph is based on the subscription list in BEA, M/, fos. r–r. It
includes details of subscriptions made by agents and attorneys on behalf of others. For
more on agents and brokers for English and overseas investors see Dickson, Financial
Revolution, –, –, –; C. H. Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, ), –.
43 Graham, Corruption, Party and Government , , , .
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money and £, for the duke of Newcastle and earl of Orford,
and his brothers put in a further £,. The trustee Sir Henry
Furnese invested £, himself and £, for his correspondents
in Amsterdam,Messrs George and Isaac Cliﬀord, and Sir Theodore
Janssen invested £, for himself and others.44 As Harley noted
to Stepney on  March, the success of the loan was proof of the
queen’s ‘zeal’ for the imperial court and its interests, ‘and also of her
good subjects, to make such a loan at a time when near three million
is to be taken upon annuities, besides the loans upon the land tax
and malt [tax], and also a very great East India sale’, amounting in
total to no less than six million pounds sterling.45
The imperial loan of  therefore resembled most closely the
domestic public loans of the same period, in which political and
ﬁnancial elites were expected to contribute as a matter of public
service as well as private proﬁt.46 It therefore proved possible to fulﬁl
both at a time when there were many other tempting opportunities
available to investors with money to subscribe. Yet this powerful
overlap of factors came under strain after March  as events in
Europe pushed the two out of alignment, as can be seen from the
patterns of trade in the stock of the imperial loan recorded in the
transfer book at the Bank of England.47 Between March  and
the repayment of the loan in  trades took place worth about
£, or nearly half the total loan, though this ﬁgure includes
stock traded two or more times. The trades were concentrated in a
speciﬁcmoment of crisis that occurred in July when the Swedish
troops of Charles XII occupied Silesia itself as part of his campaigns
in the Great Northern War.48 Reluctant concessions by the imperial
court prevented the conﬂict from escalating, but Luttrell noted that
the news had driven down the price of the stock by  per cent, and
between July and December about ﬁfty people disposed of stock
worth £, or about  per cent of the loan.49 For example, the
Huguenot widow Susanna Hugetan had invested £, through
the merchant Stephen Seignoret, who also subscribed £, of his
own money, but on  September she withdrew £,—no less
44 Ibid.  45 BL, Add. MS : Harley to Stepney,  Mar. /.
46 See e.g. Graham, Corruption, Party and Government , –.
47 BEA, AC / (Stock Ledger of Imperial Loan, –). The following
paragraphs are based on this record.
48 Whaley, Holy Roman Empire, ii. ; Ingrao, In Quest and Crisis, –.
49 Luttrell, Brief Relation, vi. .
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than £, changed hands in this single month—and sold it on
to the Huguenot merchant Rene Rane.50
This turnover persisted throughout until the (second) Treaty of
Altranstadt was signed in August, which granted religious conces-
sions to the region’s Protestants in return for the withdrawal of
Swedish forces from Silesia. There were on average about eight
transactions worth just over £, per month between January
and August, including key ﬁgures such as Prince George of Den-
mark, who transferred his stock to John and William de Hertoghe
in June . Charles Hedges and Robert Harley had sold oﬀ their
holdings by December , and Moses de Medina sold his stock
of £, on  September. Although he then received £ from
Edward Pauncefort the next month on October, this was assigned
to Sir James Bateman only four days later, leaving de Medina with
no further holdings by the end of the year. By contrast, after news
arrived of the Treaty of Altranstadt the turnover fell to three sales
of about £, per month from September to December, and then
halved again in  and continued to decline. The news from Eur-
ope and the high volume of sales had the eﬀect, however, of pushing
down the value of the stock even further, and Marlborough noted
in December  that it had lost  per cent of its face value.51 This
not only undermined the prestige of the stock, which was to some
extent an index of public conﬁdence in the imperial court, but also,
as noted below, made it unlikely that further loans could be raised
with equal facility. The sale of stock therefore had to be arrested or
managed, and the pattern of turnover reveals some hints of this.
Sir Henry Furnese was already one of the largest subscribers in
March , committing some £, to the loan, but by the end
of January  he had virtually doubled his holdings by accepting
stock worth £, from six separate sellers, including several
government oﬃcials. This stock accounted for nearly a third of
the £, traded in these months. Either Furnese had lent them
the money to make their initial subscriptions, or he was accepting
the stock in order to prevent it circulating in the open market and
50 Rane immediately disposed of it to Daniel Hayes, a London merchant trading
with Hamburg who managed to triple his holdings in this period from £, to
£, by  from various sources. For example, in May  Rane sold on to Claude
Desmaretz a block of stock worth £ he had received three years earlier from Moses
Barrow, which Demaretz then sold again in turn to Hayes only three months later.
51 Marlborough to Pensioner Heinsius,  Dec. , in Letters and Dispatches, ed.
Murray, iii. 
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undermining the price further. Over the next two years Furnese
received a further £, in stock from eight people, including
Sunderland’s holdings of £, in January , and by the time
the loan was liquidated in  his portfolio had therefore tripled to
£,. Sir Theodore Janssen, who was an investor and remitter
but not a trustee, also tripled his holdings over this period. Between
them, these two men controlled by  about  per cent of the
entire loan. Three other men controlled a further  per cent.
The merchant William Baron increased his holdings from £ to
£, in the early months in , probably as a speculator, while
the Russia merchant William Dawson steadily bought up about
£,, and the Hamburg merchant Daniel Hayes likewise steadily
tripled his investment from £, to £,.52 All four men were
therefore acting as investors, presumably buying stock at low prices
in the hope of realizing capital gains when it rose.
A number of other stockbrokers and goldsmith-bankers, such
as Moses Hart, Rene Rane, and John Marke, also subscribed or
bought large amounts of stock for themselves and others, but just
as quickly sold it on. For instance, Hart invested £ in March
, then sold this on to the goldsmith-banker Richard Hoare
in December, then brokered the sale of other stock to Daniel
Hayes and assigned about £, he had received from Hoare to
Dawson in June and July . Other stock he sold to Janssen and
the goldsmith-banker John Marke.53 Marke received about £,
before June , and reassigned it to William Baron and Janssen.54
Rene Rane handled the sale of Susanna Hugetan’s bloc of £,
stock to Daniel Hayes in September , then sold further stock
for £ to Claude Desmaretz in May , who then assigned it
to Hayes three months later. A set of interlocking ﬁnancial networks
and connections therefore managed the trade in the stock of the
imperial loan, part of the wider stock markets that Anne Murphy
and others have described which had emerged in London during
the ﬁnancial revolution, and helped to hold up the price of stock
even as it fell by ensuring that a buyer could always be found for it.55
52 See above, n. .
53 For Hart see Graham, Corruption, Party and Government , , .
54 Gary S. Shea, ‘Sir George Caswall vs. the Duke of Portland: Financial Contracts
and Litigation in the Wake of the South Sea Bubble’, in Jeremy Atack and Larry Neal
(eds.), The Origin and Development of Financial Markets and Institutions: From the Seventeenth
Century to the Present (Cambridge, ), –, at .
55 See Anne Murphy, The Origins of English Financial Markets: Investment and Speculation
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Yet Furnese stands out as exceptional, accumulating large amounts
of stock at a moment when it was important that the price of the
stock be held up, and this suggests that at least some of the trustees
helped to preserve the public interest even at the risk of their own
private proﬁt.
‘For the Honour of Our Country’: The  Imperial Loan
The most immediate result of the imperial loan of  was that
both the British and imperial states were enabled to punch well
above their weight, and win a decisive strategic victory in northern
Italy. Its success encouraged imitation. The British ambassador in
Prussia reported that the duke of Saxony proposed to raise  million
crowns in Holland and England, and urged that it be blocked,
since the money would end up with the Swedish forces.56 Stepney
reported in  that the Dutch hoped to mortgage the customs
revenues of Ghent and Ostend in return for a loan of ,
ﬂ or £,, but Marlborough poured cold water on this plan
in December. ‘When it is considered that what was lent on the
security of Silesia is now near twenty percent under the principal
sum advanced’, he noted, ‘no such thing can be expected from
hence.’57 He also received a ‘Project pour d’emprunt d’une million
d’ecus a  pct’ dating from , where the Swedish court proposed
to mortgage the revenues of the duchies of Bremen and Verden as
security for a loan.58 The most concrete outcome, though, was a
further imperial loan in , to support the imperial forces in the
Low Countries, and analysing this episode in the same way reveals
a very familiar set of diplomatic, political, and ﬁnancial links in
London and Vienna.59 These networks helped the imperial court to
push through this important transaction in the very brief window
before the South Sea Bubble (Cambridge, ), –, –, –; Dickson, Financial
Revolution, –; S. R. Cope, ‘The Stock Exchange Revisited: A New Look at the
Market in Securities in London in the Eighteenth Century’, Economica,   (),
–, at –.
56 TNA, SP /, fo. r: Raby to Harley,  Feb.  (NS).
57 TNA, SP /, fos. r, r: Stepney to Cardonnel,  Aug. (NS),  Aug.
; Marlborough to Pensioner Heinsius,  Dec. , in Letters and Dispatches, ed.
Murray, iii. .
58 BL, Add MS , fo. r: ‘Project pour d’emprunt d’une million d’ecus a
 pct’ [].
59 For the strategic context see Mikoletzky, ‘Die große Anleihe’, –; Whaley, Holy
Roman Empire, ii. –.
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available before a political and ﬁnancial crisis in August  cut oﬀ
even the possibility of further supplies.
‘Monsr le Comte de Gallas m’a entretenu sur la diﬃculte où
on est à Vienne de trouver l’argent nécessaire pour les frais de
la guerre’, Marlborough wrote to Prince Eugene and Sinzendorﬀ
in January  from London, acknowledging the urgent need for
cash but noting that it would be impossible to delay or defer the
planned repayment of the  loan, ‘puisque la moindre mention
serait capable de ruiner tout le crédit’.60 A new loan was therefore
the only option, and he agreed to use his leverage to persuade
the merchants who had already advanced the emperor money to
provide ‘une nouvelle avance’ of £,, ‘et pour les encourager,
je m’oﬀrirai de souscrire le premier’. Two weeks later he conﬁrmed
that it had been necessary to delay making any moves until the
lottery ﬂoated by the Treasury was out of the way ‘de peur de nuire
à l’un et à l’autre’, but he promised he would now do what he could
to push the loan forward, ‘mais vous pouvez bien juger que quand
cette lotterie donne un intérêt plus avantageux que l’emprunt sur
la Silésie, il ne sera pas fort facile de trouver plus d’argent à ce
prix-là sur un fonds étranger’.61 The loan would therefore face
more diﬃcult conditions than it had in March , and it would
risk being crowded out of a market that was glutted with eight years
of wartime loans that oﬀered investors in London better security
and a higher rate of return on their investment.62
Although Narcissus Luttrell reported in his diary on  March
 that commissioners would shortly be appointed to raise the
necessary funds, it was not until April that Godolphin was able to
report to Marlborough that, ‘to give you some comfort after these
melancholy reﬂections . . . we have this day begun the subscription
for the £, upon the Silesia fonds’.63 A further set of letters
patent were issued by the crown on  March , appointing
commissioners and encouraging subscriptions on much the same
basis as before. The money was to be used by the emperor solely
to support his troops in the Low Countries, and ‘we are persuaded
that divers of our loving subjects, when they consider of what
60 Marlborough to Prince Eugene,  Jan. /; Marlborough to Sinzendorﬀ, 
Jan. /, in Letters and Dispatches, ed. Murray, iv. , .
61 Marlborough to Sinzendorﬀ,  Jan. /, ibid. iv. .
62 Dickson, Financial Revolution, –.
63 Luttrell, Brief Relation, vi. , . The list of subscribers and agents, and the
dates of subscription, are from BEA, M/, fos. r–r.
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importance the supply of the said money is for carrying on the
war in Flanders, [and] with what eﬀect may be to the common
cause’, would thereby be persuaded to contribute the necessary
funds, though once again the imperial letters patent conﬁrming the
security were not formally signed by the emperor until October
that year.64 Yet although Luttrell noted on  May that at least
£, had already been subscribed, Furnese wrote conﬁdentially
to Marlborough two weeks later that virtually no money had been
received, and that those who had subscribed had done so out of
patriotism rather than for proﬁt. ‘I can assure Your Grace that this
loan is at this time a greater virtue in us’, he noted, ‘for there are
several good Parliamentary funds by which people may make ten
percent of their money.’65
By June the need became even more urgent. ‘Prince Eugene
has desired me to press you to get the subscription perfected’,
Marlborough noted to Godolphin from the Low Countries, ‘it
being the only money they have for the subsisting the Imperial
troops in this country.’66 Godolphin replied that the loan had
almost been completed, but Furnese reported gloomily the next
day that ‘the present situation of aﬀairs has very much retarded
that loan, and ’tis with the greatest diﬃculty that we have got it up
to £,’.67 This had involved direct eﬀort by Godolphin and
the ﬁnancial elites. Furnese reported to Marlborough on  May
that ‘my Lord Treasurer’s great care has overcome the diﬃculties
that seemed insuperable in relation to the imperial loan’.68 Yet
only £ was subscribed between  and  June, and more than
half of the £, invested on  and  June came from ﬁgures
who had already subscribed large sums but were now persuaded
to increase them. For example, Sir James Bateman had already
subscribed £, when the books opened on  April but now
contributed another £,, while William Dawsonne doubled his
holdings from £, to £,. Undoubtedly under pressure from
64 BEA, M/, fos. r–r: Letters Patent of HM Queen Anne,  Mar. ; and
fos. r–r: Letters Patent of Joseph I,  Oct.  (NS).
65 Luttrell, Brief Relation, vi. ; BL, Add. MS , fo. r: Furnese to
Marlborough,  May .
66 Marlborough to Godolphin,  June  (NS), in Correspondence, ed. Snyder, iii.
–.
67 Luttrell, Brief Relation, vi. ; Godolphin to Marlborough,  June , in
Correspondence, ed. Snyder, iii. –; BL, Add. MS , fo. r: Furnese to
Marlborough,  June .
68 BL, Add. MS , fo. r: Furnese to Marlborough,  May .
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the ministry, the Court of Directors of the Bank of England agreed
on  June to loosen its discount policy for bills of exchange ‘with
such persons as they shall approve . . . in order to be subscribed
to the Imperial Loan’, thereby ensuring that those who wanted to
subscribe had money to do so.69
Once again, the trustees and commissioners acted as agents
and brokers for others, helping to channel funds into the loan.
Francis Eyles subscribed £, for himself and £, for his
brother-in-law John Haskin Styles.70 Sir William Scawen invested
£, of his own money and £, for Messrs Thomas Scawen
& Robert Stockdale, as well as £ for the Whig clothier and army
contractor John Elwill of Devon.71 Marlborough and Godolphin
led by example, investing at least £, in April to encourage
subscriptions. ‘I am very glad you have had so good success in
the loan of Silesia, for without that money the imperial troops
of this army could not have subsisted but with great diﬃculties’,
Marlborough noted, ‘[and] you might be sure there was no need
of your giving yourself the trouble of an excuse for the subscription
you make for me, for not only in money matters but in everything
else you may command your humble servant.’72
Further sums came from politicians, public oﬃcials, and contrac-
tors. For example, at least £, was subscribed byWilliam Sloper,
the deputy paymaster of the army and head of the Pay Oﬃce, who
contributed only £ on his own account but about £, from
his employer James Brydges, Paymaster of the Forces Abroad, and
£ from Marlborough’s senior general William Cadogan.73 Both
men had co-operated with Sloper since  to proﬁt from the war
and invest the proceeds, with Cadogan writing to Brydges earlier
in  that the recent failure of peace negotiations ‘will, I am
persuaded, occasion the falling of the best funds and in my opinion
that will be the time to employ one’s money’.74 Sloper also invested
£ on behalf of the London goldsmith-banker John Campbell,
69 BEA, G/ (Board of Directors, Minute Book ‘F’), p. .
70 He also invested £, for the earl of Portland.
71 For Scawen see Graham, Corruption, Party and Government , . For Elwill see E.
Cruickshanks, S. Handley, and D. W. Hayton (eds.), History of Parliament: The Commons,
–,  vols. (Cambridge, ), iii. –.
72 Godolphin to Marlborough,  Apr. ; Marlborough to Godolphin,  May
, in Correspondence, ed. Snyder, iii. –, .
73 Graham, Corruption, Party and Government , esp. –, –.
74 Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, CA, Stowe MS, ST, vol. v. ,
: Cadogan to Brydges,  Feb.  (NS),  Mar.  (NS).
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who handled private accounts for Sloper himself and his colleague
in Lisbon, WilliamMorrice, who received a letter from Campbell in
May noting that he still held large balances that he was seeking to
invest.75 ‘I should [have] been willing to put it on the land tax had
I known your mind’, Campbell wrote, ‘and shall still if you desire
it.’ It seems likely that the £ which Sloper invested for him was
either on his own account or that of clients such as Morrice. Private
interest and the public proﬁt had converged once more.
The samewas true in the commercial sphere. TheWhigmerchant
Sir Lambert Blackwell had subscribed £, in  and bought
a further £ in September , and although he did not now
invest any of his own money he acted as agent for others investing
at least £,, including £, from the merchant Sir William
Hodges and his family, who subscribed at least £, in total either
directly or through Blackwell and Lionel Herne, a senior oﬃcial at
the Treasury and Exchequer, who also invested £ for himself
and £ for others.76 On the other hand, some agents continued
to act merely as brokers or intermediaries: for example, Moses Hart
made no investment at all, either on his own account or for others,
but the Dutch broker and banker Conrad de Gols subscribed
about £ for various clients and the London banker Thomas
Glegg handled subscriptions for no less than £, for three
separate clients.77 Most impressively, although Furnese subscribed
only £, directly and£ on behalf of two others, his agent and
factotum Moses Berenger, ‘Sir Harry’s head clerk, that doth all his
aﬀairs’, handled further subscriptions for £,, including £,
from the East India merchant Elihu Yale and £, from theWhig
naval commander Sir Charles Wager on  June, in addition to
the £, he had already subscribed one month before.78 By 
June Furnese had therefore directly or indirectly subscribed at least
£, in total, nearly  per cent of the entire loan.
The proﬁle of subscribers was therefore heavily weighted towards
75 Coutts & Co. Archive, London, Letterbook No. , fo. r: Campbell to Morrice,
 May . For Campbell and Morrice see Graham, Corruption, Party and Government ,
, .
76 Cruickshanks, Handley, and Hayton (eds.), History of Parliament , iii. –, iv.
–; Graham, Corruption, Party and Government , .
77 For de Gols see Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce, . For Glegg, see TNA, PROB
//: Will of Thomas Glegg, goldsmith and banker of Lombard Street, City of
London ( June ).
78 For Berenger see Graham, Corruption, Party and Government , .
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larger investors who were more amenable to private pressure. Only
about £, was subscribed by thirty-four people in denomina-
tions under £, though these represented a quarter of the total
subscribers. On the other hand, roughly the same number each
pledged £, or more, accounting for some £, in total. This
reﬂected in part the emergency measures taken at the very end of
the subscription. Furnese wrote to Marlborough on  July that there
remained £, to be subscribed, noting that he and his other
commissioners ‘are ashamed to let this loan go without being full,
[and] we have each of us writ good sums and will still subscribe
something rather than not ﬁll it’.79 He asked Marlborough to allow
further sums to be subscribed in his name, and those of other key
ﬁgures, ‘that we may not want (for the honour of our country) so
small a sum as £, to make up £,’, though in fact only
another £, was found before the loan was closed.80 In all, by
 June eleven key ﬁgures directly and indirectly controlled stock
worth £, or nearly  per cent of the total, an average of
more than £, each. They included the bankers and merchants
noted above such as Bateman (£,), Eyles (£,), Furnese
or Berenger (£,), Heathcote (£,), Hodges (£,), and
Scawen (£,) with very close links to the Whig ministry and
its projects, as well as Godolphin himself (£,), and separate
ﬁgures such as William Dawson (£,), Henry Lewis (£,),
and Robert Vansittart (£,). The latter was a Germanmerchant,
possibly investing on behalf of others.81
Intermediaries therefore continued to play an important role
in directing the ﬂow of money into the second imperial loan,
enabling Furnese to despatch three letters of credit for , ﬂ
or about £, in May, June, and July to Prince Eugene in Italy.
This pre-empted both the ﬁnal subscriptions in London and the
conﬁrmation of the terms of the loan by the Silesian Estates and the
imperial court on  October  (NS), and was at a time when
Furnese was himself under enormous ﬁnancial pressure and had
virtually bankrupted himself supporting British armies operating
79 BL, Add. MS , fo. r: Furnese to Marlborough,  June .
80 BL, Add. MS , fo. r–v: Furnese to Marlborough,  July .
81 Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, The Forgotten Majority: German Merchants in London,
Naturalization, and Global Trade, – (Oxford, ), –, –; Henry Sanders,
The History and Antiquities of Shenstone, in the County of Staﬀord (London, ), .
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in Europe.82 By the time the conﬁrmation was signed, markets in  []
London had collapsed. Furnese had already complained on  July
of ‘this present time, when all else runs counter to what every honest
man might reasonably expect’, and the fall of Godolphin and the
Whigs in August created a ﬁnancial crisis that ended any chance of
further foreign loans. The relative success of the imperial loan of
 in raising more than  per cent of its total capital at a time of
ﬁnancial stringency, in the very narrow window before any further
loans were cut oﬀ entirely, therefore reﬂected a careful process of
political and ﬁnancial management that sought to balance public
service and private proﬁt for investors, but went on largely behind
the scenes.
Conclusion
The ﬂotation of the imperial loans in  and  was as much
a political and diplomatic process as a ﬁnancial one. Although the
loans had to conform at some level to the needs of the market by
oﬀering suﬃcient security and a competitive rate of interest, these
could be secured only by focused diplomatic eﬀorts, and the actual
process of ﬂotation was assisted by political and ﬁnancial elites
who invested for reasons of public service rather than private proﬁt
alone. As a result the loans were ﬁlled up more quickly than they
might otherwise have been, enjoyed smaller falls in value than they
might otherwise have suﬀered, and directly contributed to a major
strategic victory in northern Italy. The process was therefore far
from impersonal. Though there was no direct connection between
Francis Morrogh, a merchant of Portsmouth in Hampshire who
subscribed £ to the imperial loan of  through his fellow
merchant Sir Lambert Blackwell, and the imperial paymaster in
northern Italy who spent the money when it arrived, or even
the burghers of Breslau in Silesia who ultimately provided his
reimbursement, a long chain of intermediaries helped to bring all
three together.83 Each link in the chain had a form of personal
linkage to the next, even if the net result was to bring together
parties who had no obvious or direct connection with each other.
82 See above, n. . For Furnese see Graham, Corruption, Party and Government ,
–.
83 TNA, PROB //: Will of Francis Morrogh, merchant of Portsmouth,
Hampshire ( July ).
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The main change that the ‘ﬁnancial revolution’ seems to have
brought about was that these linkages were now stronger and more
extensive than they had been before, and were able to aggregate
much larger amounts of capital.
This episode also suggests that, in focusing on the precocious
evolution of ﬁscal and military state structures in Britain and
Europe in this period, the continued importance of transnational
resource mobilization may well have been overlooked. Within the
British Isles itself the process of state formation has often been
written from the perspective of London and south-east England,
whereas it is now clear that both Ireland and Scotland provided
resources such as manpower that supplemented English resources
and even allowed the British state to focus more fully and eﬀectively
on its core competencies.84 In this case the British state was able
to project power indirectly and achieve its broader strategic aims
by funding the imperial armies in northern Italy, in a period
when it lacked the manpower and military resources to deploy
troops there directly, while the imperial court was able to satisfy its
own overlapping policy objectives by exploiting the surplus capital
available in London rather than drawing on its own overstrained
money markets in Vienna. States were therefore not autarkic or
self-suﬃcient bureaucratic systems in this period, but embedded
within a much wider matrix of transnational exchange that helped
both sides to deploy power and created a temporary set of shared
interests.85 Even as the structures of the British ﬁscal–military
state crystallized during the War of the Spanish Succession, this
process of transnational exchange clearly remained important, and
successfully served as a model for further transactions throughout
the eighteenth century.86  []
84 Aaron Graham and Patrick Walsh (eds.), The British Fiscal–Military States, –
c. (Farnham, ), esp. eid., ‘Introduction’, –.
85 I am indebted to Peter Wilson for suggesting this interpretation to me and
encouraging me to explore it further.
86 See above, n. .
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